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Abstract
Performance sensitive debt (PSD) contracts link a loan’s interest rate to a mea-
sure of the borrower’s credit relevant performance, e.g., if the borrower becomes
less credit worthy, the interest rate increases according to a predetermined sched-
ule. We derive and empirically test a pricing model for PSD contracts and ￿nd
that interest increasing contracts are priced re￿ecting a substantial risk of shocks
to borrower credit quality. Borrowers using such contracts are of an overall higher
credit quality compared to borrowers using interest decreasing contracts. These
contracts are priced as if no risk of shocks to borrower credit quality is present.
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1Introduction
Performance sensitive debt (PSD) contracts link the interest rate paid on a ￿rm’s loan
to a measure of its credit relevant performance over time. The two most common categories
of ￿rm credit performance measures are cash ￿ow ratios and credit ratings. Since the mid
1990’s performance sensitive provisions are common in both private and public corporate
loans. Using Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan database for the years 1993 - 2010 we ￿nd that
PSD loans constitute 11.2% of the total number of loans in the database and 35.1% of loans
granted in the U.S. and Canada. Market participants indicate that more than half of recently
issued syndicated bank loans in Europe include such provisions. Based on ￿nancial valu-
ation theory, using results from Mjłs & Persson (2010) and observed contractual designs,
we propose a valuation model to price PSD contracts with a credit performance measure
de￿ned by debt to cash ￿ow (Debt/CF). Our model includes the possibility of shocks to the
borrower’s credit quality. The source of such a shock could in principle be any economic
event that a￿ects the borrower’s credit quality. In our valuation model we implement these
shocks as jumps in the total amount of debt. We, in particular, study two important sub-
classes of PSD contracts; interest increasing and interest decreasing PSD contracts. The
￿rst category includes loan contracts where the borrower initially pays the lowest contrac-
tual interest rate, and where the interest rate increases if the borrower’s credit performance
measure deteriorates. The second category includes loan contracts where the borrower pays
the highest contractual interest rate initially, and where the interest rate decreases if the
borrower’s credit performance measure improves.
2We empirically test the pricing performance of our model in the following way: Firstly,
we collect contractual, borrower and ￿nancial market data related to 3,052 PSD contracts.
Secondly, we estimate volatility and drift from borrower and market data. Thirdly, we im-
pose ad hoc assumptions regarding jumps in the amount of debt. Finally, we calibrate the
model prices to par1 by adjusting the shock frequency. Our results show a signi￿cant di￿er-
ence between interest increasing and interest decreasing contracts regarding shocks to credit
quality. Shocks to credit quality must be included to correctly price interest increasing PSD
contracts. Interest decreasing PSD contracts are priced as if no shocks are present. By
analyzing borrower data we ￿nd that the most ￿nancially sound borrowers choose interest
increasing PSD contracts, which are priced re￿ecting substantially higher risk of shocks to
borrower credit quality compared to interest decreasing PSD contracts.
Our paper is related to the article by Manso, Strulovici, & Tchistyi (2010), who develop
a general pricing model for a broad class of PSD using the framework of Leland (1994).
They show that with no other market imperfections than bankruptcy costs and tax bene￿ts
of debt, the use of PSD contracts leads to earlier default and lower equity value compared
to comparable ￿xed-rate debt, and therefore ￿nd the use of these contracts not optimal.
In their screening model a company can choose to issue either performance sensitive debt
or ￿xed rate debt. They ￿nd that the existence of PSD contracts can be explained by the
1Our analysis does not take into account potential administrative, capital, and regulatory related costs
incurred by the lender and, thus, assumes that the initial market value equals par value of the loan.
3contracts’ ability to mitigate adverse selection problems for the borrower. This conclusion is
supported by an empirical analysis which shows that ￿rms using performance sensitive debt
are more likely to get improved credit ratings in the future compared to ￿rms that choose
ordinary ￿xed-interest loans. They do not empirically test their pricing models for PSD
contracts, nor do they study interest increasing or interest decreasing contracts separately.
Asquith, Beatty, & Weber (2005) study these two PSD categories separately, and ￿nd that
interest decreasing PSD contracts are used when adverse selection costs are high.
We focus on the pricing of PSD contracts, and our model of a PSD contract di￿ers
from Manso et al. (2010) in the following ways. We analyze contracts with ￿nite maturity,
and derive a closed form solution in the special case of no shocks in the credit performance
measure. All PSD contracts in our sample have a contractual default barrier, de￿ned by
a critical value of the credit performance measure. This default barrier is determined as
an element of the initial contract negotiations jointly with all other contractual parameters.
The contractual default barrier is exogenous (see Table VIII for an example) as opposed to
the optimal endogenous company liquidation-trigger analyzed in Manso et al. (2010). A cal-
culation of an optimal endogenous default level requires assumptions about a ￿rm’s complete
capital structure. In our sample, most borrowers have a complex debt structure, and PSD,
on average, only makes up less than half of a company’s total debt as illustrated by Table
V. It is, thus, an advantage of our analysis that we use the exogenous contractual default
barrier directly. In order to better understand the contractual default barrier, we randomly
4select 50 loan contracts in our sample and manually review the terms of each contract. We
￿nd that all of these contracts have cross-default clauses, and have also consulted lawyers
in this respect. Cross-default implies that a borrower’s default on any single debt contract
leads to default on its other debt contracts as well. Whilst acknowledging the impact of PSD
contracts on capital structure and debt renegotiations both as related and relevant research
topics, they fall outside the scope of this paper.
We only analyze PSD contracts where the credit performance measure is based on total
￿rm cash ￿ow and debt. This assumption excludes, e.g., rating based contracts. Market
evidence indicates that cash ￿ow and debt based performance measures, which our model
covers, are the most common performance measures in such PSD contracts (See Table I).
Our empirical results con￿rm and re￿ne the understanding of the signaling hypothesis in
Manso et al. (2010). Our results indicate that borrowers may signal quality by selecting
interest increasing PSD loans. Low quality borrowers, which are more credit constrained,
do not mimic this behavior since they would have to incur the additional borrowing costs
related to the lenders rational assessment of risk of shocks to credit quality. Contrary to
the ￿ndings of Asquith et al. (2005), we ￿nd that interest decreasing PSD contracts cannot
be used for signaling purposes since these contracts do not induce a cost for low quality
borrowers.
Several papers have empirically tested the ability of structural debt models to produce
5correct prices and/or credit spreads, e.g., Eom, Helwege, & Huang (2004), Huang & Huang
(2003). Our empirical analysis con￿rms the initial overpricing in situations with a large
distance-to-default as found in earlier literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses related liter-
ature. Section 2 presents the general economic set-up and some details of the theoretical
pricing model. Section 3 provides a brief description of the market for PSD loans, as well
as a description of the data we use. Section 4 includes an example of a PSD contract and
calculates its theoretical price in the case of no jumps. In Section 5 we present and ana-
lyze empirical results for the whole sample. Section 6 concludes. Technical calculations and
supplementary descriptive statistics are collected in two appendices.
1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the broad literature on credit risk, and especially to the part of
the literature focusing on pricing performance sensitive debt. Credit risk is de￿ned as the
risk that a borrower will not honor her contractual obligations towards the lender. There are
two dominating approaches to model credit risk in the ￿nance literature; structural models
and reduced form models. Structural models view debt and equity as contingent claims on
total ￿rm value, and hence these claims could be valued using option pricing techniques.
This approach was pioneered by Merton (1974) and further developed by, e.g., Black & Cox
(1976), Geske (1977), Longsta￿ & Schwartz (1995) and Leland (1994). Reduced form models
6assume that credit risk is modeled by default arrival intensity. This approach was pioneered
by Jarrow & Turnbull (1992) and further developed by, e.g., Jarrow & Turnbull (1995) and
Jarrow, Lando, & Turnbull (1997). In the recent years researchers have successfully merged
the two modeling approaches by introducing alternative information ￿ltrations and jumps in
structural debt models. In short, reduced form models can be viewed as structural models
with incomplete information or with jumps in the underlying asset. Du￿e & Lando (2001)
were the ￿rst to introduce incomplete information. Further advances have been made by,
e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Helwege (2003), Jarrow & Protter (2004), Coculesco,
Geman, & Jeanblanc (2008), Guo, Jarrow, & Zeng (2009), and Lindset, Lund, & Persson
(2011). The notion of jump risk in ￿nancial economics was introduced by Merton (1976).
Both structural credit risk models and reduced form models have been successfully ap-
plied for the purpose of pricing performance sensitive debt contracts. Lando & Mortensen
(2004) and Houweling, Mentink, & Vorst (2004) use the latter framework to develop pric-
ing models for rating based PSD. Similarly, Bhanot & Mello (2006) and Koziol & Lawrenz
(2010) develop structural pricing models for rating-based PSD contracts. Manso, Strulovici,
& Tchistyi (2010) also use the structural model framework to derive a theoretical model
pricing more general PSD contracts.
The existing literature on performance sensitive debt has mainly been focused on ex-
plaining the existence of these contracts. Assuming positive bankruptcy costs, performance
7sensitive debt contracts, at least at a ￿rst glance, seem ine￿cient. Whilst increased interest
payments in bad states of the world may have an ex ante disciplining e￿ect, the ex post con-
ditional probability of bankruptcy increases, and a PSD contract destroys, rather than adds,
￿rm value. In the light of this intuition, existing research on PSD has mainly focused on the
e￿ciency and existence of these contracts. Regarding the existence, the problem of potential
information asymmetry as pointed out in the seminal work of Myers & Majluf (1984), and
the problem of agency costs, identi￿ed by Jensen & Meckling (1976), both may be important
explanations for the use of PSD contracts as disciplining and/or signaling mechanisms.
Tchistyi (2006) studies optimal security design in a dynamic setting where the agency
problem arises from the assumption that a manager in charge of a project could divert cash
￿ows for his own consumption. Allowing cash ￿ows to be correlated over time, he ￿nds
that the optimal debt contract could be implemented using a credit line with performance
sensitive provisions.
Asquith, Beatty, & Weber (2005) make an important contribution to the understand-
ing of performance sensitive bank debt. In addition to information asymmetry and agency
costs, they claim that the existence of renegotiation costs provides another rationale for using
PSD contracts. The authors ￿nd empirical evidence that performance sensitive debt is used
when it has the largest net bene￿ts, i.e., when moral hazard, adverse selection problems, or
renegotiation costs are likely to be high. More speci￿cally they ￿nd that interest decreasing
8PSD contracts are used when prepayment of the loan is more likely, i.e., when borrowers’
relative bargaining power is assumed to be high and when costs related to adverse selection
are large. They also ￿nd that interest increasing PSD contracts are used when moral haz-
ard costs are high and that including interest increasing provisions in the debt contract has
signi￿cant economic e￿ects since, controlling for ￿rm characteristics, borrowers are o￿ered
26 basis points initial lower credit spreads (over LIBOR) when these provisions are included
in the contract.
Other important contributions to the PSD literature includes Roberts & Su￿ (2009)
on debt renegotiations and Tchistyi, Yermack, & Yun (2010) on CEO equity incentives.
Several papers empirically test di￿erent structural models of credit risk, focusing on
the models’ ability to replicate observed market prices and credit spreads. The evidence is
mixed. Jones, Mason, & Rosenfeld (1984) ￿nd that predicted prices are, on average, 4.5%
too high, and that the pricing error is largest for speculative-grade ￿rms. More recently,
Eom et al. (2004) compare ￿ve di￿erent models, and ￿nd that predicted credit spreads from
some are too high, whereas some models generate too low credit spreads. Huang & Huang
(2003) also test several di￿erent models. They use a calibration approach based on historical
data, and ￿nd that credit risk accounts for only a small fraction of observed corporate credit
spreads for investment grade bonds, but accounts for a larger share of high-yield bond credit
spreads. They also ￿nd that di￿erent structural models predict fairly similar credit spreads.
92 The economic model
A General set-up
This section reviews the general set-up and the main results needed for our pricing model.
A ￿ltered probability space (
;F;fFtg;Q) is given. In particular, Q represents a ￿xed
equivalent martingale measure. We impose the standard frictionless, continuous time mar-
ket assumptions, see, e.g., Du￿e (2001).
To implement shocks to the borrower’s credit quality we include jumps in the amount of
debt. A jump in the amount of debt is a tractable example of a shock to borrower credit
quality. Even though we let debt follow a jump process, we disregard any overall capital
structure considerations in our analysis.
Let Wt be a standard Brownian motion under the equivalent martingale measure Q.
We assume throughout that the time t ￿rm cash ￿ow rate t under the equivalent martingale
measure Q is given by the stochastic di￿erential equation
dt = tdt + tdWt; (1)
where the initial value 0 is a constant. Here the drift parameter  and the di￿usion param-
eter  are constants. Denoting the constant risk-free interest rate by r, where r > , the
















t [] denotes the expectation under the equivalent martingale measure Q conditional
on Ft, the information available at time t. Hence, the market value of the ￿rm’s assets is
given by expression (3) divided by the constant (r   ). In particular, A0 =
0
r .
Let Nt denote a Poisson process with constant intensity  under the equivalent mar-
tingale measure Q. Let fYig;i  1; be a sequence of independent and identically distributed
random variables under Q, independent of both Nt and Wt. We assume that the ￿rm is





where Dt = D0 when Nt = 0. Here Yi can be interpreted as the change in debt due to jump i
relative to the amount of debt just before jump i. Realized values of Yi > 1 implies an increase
in the amount of debt, and realized values of Yi < 1 implies a decrease in the amount of debt.
















11where the initial value  = 0 =
0
D0 is a constant.
Let T be the ￿nite time horizon corresponding to the maturity of debt. Let the con-
stant C <  be an absorbing barrier, and de￿ne the stopping time  (with respect to Ft)
as
 = infft  0;t  Cg: (4)
The constant C can be interpreted as the contractual default barrier, and  as the time of
default.
B A Valuation Model of a PSD Contract
This subsection explains the general structure of a PSD contract. In addition to the
contractual default barrier C, a PSD contract includes n+m constant levels or non-absorbing
barriers B1;:::;Bn+m so that B1 >  > Bn+m > C. For notational simplicity only, we
let B0 = 1 and Bn+m+1 = C. We de￿ne n by the initial value of the credit performance
measure  as Bn >  > Bn+1. That is, there are n barriers above . Similarly, m represents
the number of barriers below . Observe that the contract is well de￿ned in the cases where
n = 0 and/or m = 0.
The contract speci￿es a sequence of interest rates, where ci+1 is paid when Bi > t > Bi+1,
i = 0;:::;n + m. All cis are assumed to be constants. An interest increasing contract is
de￿ned by n = 0 and c1 < c2 < ::: < cm, whereas an interest decreasing contract is de￿ned
by m = 0 and c1 < c2 < ::: < cn. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
12Illustration of a PSD Contract
Figure 1: The graph contains an example of a path of the credit performance measure t and
indicates in which regions the interest rates are c1,..., c6 respectively. Also, , B1,...,B5,
C, T, and  are depicted. C denotes the contractual default barrier. The number of non-
absorbing barriers above the starting level  is n = 2, and the number of non-absorbing
barriers below  is m = 3. In order to make the two indicated regions interest decreasing






















 time T 0
The total time 0 market value of a PSD contract can be decomposed into the time 0
market value of the interest payments and the time 0 market value of the repayment of the
principal. Let us ￿rst consider the market value of the interest payments. Consider the
corridor j de￿ned by two adjacent barriers Bj and Bj+1 for a ￿xed j. In this corridor the







 rs1fBj > s > Bj+1gds

;
where EQ[] denotes the expectation under the equivalent martingale measure Q. The total
interest payments of the PSD contract can be seen as a portfolio of such corridors. To
calculate the total time 0 market value of all interest payments from a PSD contract, we add
the time 0 market values of the contract’s corridors, i.e., V () =
Pn+m
i=0 Ci() or







 rs1fBi > s > Bi+1gds
#
: (5)
The corridor decomposition in expression (5) is the basis for the subsequent simulation anal-
ysis of the interest payments in our sample of contracts.
We ￿nd it useful to further decompose a corridor by the use of above- and below an-
nuities, see Mjłs & Persson (2010). A generic defaultable ￿nite horizon above annuity pays
the annuity rate of 1 when the credit performance measure is above some level B until de-
fault or to the horizon, whatever comes ￿rst. Denote the time 0 market value of an above









A generic defaultable ￿nite horizon below annuity pays the annuity rate of 1 when the credit
performance measure is below some level B until default or to the horizon, whatever comes









Observe that for any B, A(;B)+B(;B) = Z(), where Z() is the time 0 market price of









A corridor j can be decomposed in two equivalent ways. First, as a portfolio of a long
defaultable above annuity with annuity payment cj+1 and level Bj+1, and a short defaultable
above annuity with annuity payment cj+1 and level Bj. Second, as a portfolio of a long
defaultable below annuity with annuity payment cj+1 and level Bj, and a short defaultable
below annuity with annuity payment cj+1 and level Bj+1. The time 0 market value of corridor
j, using above annuities, is
Cj() = (A(;Bj+1)   A(;Bj))cj+1:
The time 0 market value of corridor j, using below annuities, is
Cj() = (B(;Bj)   B(;Bj+1))cj+1:
15Using above and below annuities, the total time 0 market value of all interest payments from
a PSD contract can be expressed as
V () = cn+m+1Z()  
m+n X
i=1
A(;Bi)(ci+1   ci); (6)
or
V () = c1Z() +
m+n X
i=1
B(;Bi)(ci+1   ci); (7)
Proof. Both these expressions follow from the relationship V () =
Pn+m
i=0 Ci() and the
above de￿nitions of corridors, using above- and below annuities, respectively. Observe that
A(;B0) = 0;A(;Bm+n+1) = Z();B(;B0) = Z();B(;Bn+m+1) = 0.
These expressions may be interpreted in the following ways. Expression (6) suggests that,
in principle, the borrower pays the highest interest rate cn+m+1 throughout the term of the
contract, but for each (additional) barrier away from the default level the credit performance
measure process is, the borrower is entitled to a lower interest rate. The interest rate discount
is determined by the interest rate di￿erence between each barrier and the time 0 market price
of an above annuity. Alternatively, expression (7) suggests that, in principle, the borrower
pays the lowest interest rate c1 throughout the term of the contract, but for each barrier
closer to the default level the credit performance measure process is, the borrower has to
pay an increased interest rate. The additional interest rate is determined by the interest
di￿erence between each barrier and the time 0 market price of an below annuity. Although
either of these interpretations may be used for any PSD contract of the type we consider,
16two special cases are worth emphasizing. An interest decreasing contract is characterized by
the fact that the initial interest rate of the contract equals the highest possible interest rate.
The ￿rst interpretation above, based on expression (6) seems more intuitive for this contract.
An interest increasing contract is characterized by the fact that the initial interest rate of
the contract equals the lowest possible interest rate. The second interpretation above, based
on expression (7) seems more intuitive for this contract.
We now turn to the time 0 value of the repayment of the principal. First, let Q() =
Q( > T) be the survival probability under the equivalent martingale measure Q. The time
0 market value of receiving the face value of debt ( D) in the case of no default is, thus,
De rTQ(). The time 0 market value of the recovery amount in the case of default is, sim-
ilarly, D(1   )H(). The parameter  represents the debtholders’ loss proportional to the
face value of debt in case of contractual default. Here, H() = EQ[e r1f  Tg] represents
the time 0 value of one unit of currency paid upon default if default occurs before time T.
The total time 0 value of a PSD contract is, thus,
L() = V () + De
 rTQ() + D(1   )H(): (8)
C PSD Valuation Assuming No Shocks to Credit Quality
In the special case of no jumps in the debt level Dt, i.e., Nt  0 and  = 0, we can
calculate a closed form formula for the present value of a PSD contract. In the following we
17use the superscript c to denote closed form solutions. The closed form expression for Qc()
and Hc() are standard and can be found in Appendix A. In order to calculate V () in the
case of no jumps, our starting point is expression (6) or expression (7). Mjłs & Persson
(2010) calculate closed form solutions for A(;B) and B(;B). These formulas depend on
whether the initial value of the credit performance measure  is above or below the barrier,













a(;Bi)(ci+1   ci); (9)
where Ac
b(;Bi) is the time 0 market value of an above annuity with barrier Bi where  <
Bi, and Ac
a(;Bi) is the time 0 market value of an above annuity with barrier Bi where
 > Bi. The expressions for Ac
b(;Bi) and Ac
a(;Bi) are given in expressions (28) and (24)
in Appendix A. The expression for Zc() is given in expression (21) in Appendix A. The













a(;Bi)(ci+1   ci); (10)
where Bc
b(;Bi) is the time 0 market value of a below annuity with barrier Bi where  < Bi,
and Bc
a(;Bi) is the time 0 market value of a below annuity with barrier Bi where  > Bi.
The expressions for Bc
b(;Bi) and Bc
a(;Bi) are given in expressions (31) and (29) in Appendix






c() + D(1   )H
c(); (11)
where V c() is given either by expression (9) or expression (10). Furthermore, Qc() and
Hc() are given by expressions (17), and (20), respectively.
3 Market and Data Description
This section gives an overview of the market for PSD contracts and describes the data
we use to empirically test our pricing model.
A Overview and Descriptive Statistics
The tables and statistics in this section describe the PSD contracts in the Thomson
Reuter’s Dealscan database. We have collected all available data for the years 1993 - 2010,
resulting in a total of 218,204 loans. The database contains 218,204 loans for the years 1993 -
2010, with detailed information about the global commercial loan market, focusing primarily
on corporate bank debt with longer maturities. The database provides information for both
publicly traded and privately held debt 2. The PSD part of the database includes 25,602
loans. The total outstanding principal of these PSD contracts is USD 9,900 bn. (25.6%
of the total outstanding amount). One deal may consist of several loans, usually referred
to as tranches. The data in Dealscan is reported by loans and, thus, all our data analysis
is at loan level rather than deal level. Table I reports the use of di￿erent types of credit
2See Carey et al. (1998) for a more detailed description of the database.
19performance measures in PSD contracts. Total debt-to-cash￿ow and senior debt rating are
the two most common credit performance measures in these contracts. In total, 51:3% of the
PSD contracts are directly related to cash-￿ow (25.4% of loan amount), and could potentially
be valued using our model.
PSD Credit Performance Measures
Table I: This table shows the numbers of loans with di￿erent types of credit performance measures
as a percentage of the total number of loans containing performance pricing provisions
(N=25,602 loans), and as a percentage of the total amount issued (measured in USD).
Datasource: Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan database for the years 1993-2010.
Performance measure Total number of loans Total loan amount
Total debt-to-cash￿ow 47.6 % 23.2 %
Senior debt rating 25.8 % 53.5 %
Leverage 5.7 % 3.9 %
Maturity 4.2 % 5.7 %
Senior debt-to-cash ￿ow 3.7 % 2.2 %
Outstandings 2.0 % 3.4 %
Fixed charge coverage 2.3 % 0.7 %
Debt to tangible net worth 2.0 % 0.6 %
Interest Coverage 2.5 % 1.6 %
Debt Service Coverage Ratio 0.8 % 0.1 %
Other 3.4 % 5.1 %
Table II shows the distribution of such debt contracts according to some broadly de￿ned
￿nancing purposes. PSD contracts specify a veri￿able credit performance measure in order
to trigger changes in interest rates. This fact may explain why such contracts are primarily
used by ￿rms for which audited ￿nancial reports are available. PSD contracts are seldom
used for project ￿nancing. Table III shows the existence of a credit rating for 50.3% of
PSD-borrowers compared to 13.7 % of other borrowers. Of all PSD-borrowers, 29.8 % are
rated below investment grade compared to 7.7 % of other borrowers. In addition, we ￿nd that
20Purpose of PSD
Table II: This table shows the purpose of performance sensitive loans as a percentage of the total
number of issued loans containing performance sensitive provisions (N=25,602), as well
as a percentage of the total amount issued (measured in USD). Datasource: Thomson
Reuter’s Dealscan database for the years 1993-2010.
Purpose Total number of loans Total loan amount
Acquisition-related 21.5 % 26.7 %
Re￿nancing 23.7 % 16.9 %
Working Capital 18.5 % 11.5 %
Project Finance 1.6 % 1.3 %
All Other 34.7 % 52.0 %
with negligible exceptions, all performance sensitive loans are senior ( 99:9%). Also, 57.7%
of the loans are secured, whereas 23.7% are unsecured (information regarding security is not
available for the remaining 20%.). Table IV shows that USA and Canada alone account
Borrower Ratings
Table III: This table shows the distribution of initial borrower ratings (S&P/Moody’s senior debt
ratings respectively) for both PSD (N=25,602) and non-PSD loans (N=192,602). The
numbers are calculated as the number of loans with a given borrower credit rating
divided by the total number of loans for the given category. Datasource: Thomson
Reuter’s Dealscan database for the years 1993-2010.
Rating Category PSD Non-PSD
AAA/Aaa 0.3 % 0.4%
AA/Aa 0.9 % 0.7%
A/A 5.8 % 2.2%
BBB/Baa 13.5 % 2.7%
BB/Ba 13.6 % 3.1%
B/B 13.2 % 4.1%
CCC/Caa 1.0 % 0.5%
CC/Ca 0.0 % 0.0%
C /C 0.0 % 0.0%
Sum Investment Grade 20.5 % 6.0 %
Sum Non-Investment Grade 29.8 % 7.7 %
Not Rated 49.7 % 86.3%
for almost 90% of these contracts which may be explained by the historically high level of
21sophistication of the ￿nancial markets in this region. Market participants indicate that more
than half of recently issued syndicated bank loans in Europe include such provisions.
Geographical Distribution of PSD
Table IV: This table shows the geographical distribution of performance sensitive loans as an
equal-weighted percentage of the total number of such loans (N=25,602). Datasource:
Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan database for the years 1993-2010.
Borrower region Total number of loans
USA/Canada 88.8 %
Western Europe 6.5 %
Latin America/Caribbean 1.7 %
Asia-Paci￿c 1.9 %
Eastern Europe/Russia 0.6 %
Middle East 0.4 %
Africa 0.2 %
Figure 2 shows the use of performance sensitive loans, relative to all new loans during
the last 17 years. We note that a substantial fraction of loans include performance sensitive
provisions.
Appendix B includes tables showing descriptive statistics for maturity and loan amounts
comparing performance sensitive debt and non-PSD debt, as well as an overview of broad
borrower industry classes. Loan amounts are larger for PSD contracts than for regular loans,
but the maturities do not di￿er between the categories. PSD contracts are divided appr.
40/60 between term loans and revolvers. We disregard any commitment fees and since actual
drawdown behavior of revolvers do not in￿uence their initial pricing , our analysis of pricing
is therefore equally applicable to both categories.
22Relative Use of PSD
Figure 2: The histogram shows the annual proportion of performance sensitive loans relative to
the total number of new loans. Numbers are based on data from Thomson Reuter’s
Dealscan database for the years 1993-2010.
B Data Description
B.1 Sample Construction
Our sample is extracted from Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan 3 in March 2011. We collect
all loans with performance pricing provisions, a total of 27,994 loans issued in the period
1993 - 2010. We con￿ne our analysis to contracts with interest rates linked to the company’s
debt-to-cash-￿ow ratio (Debt/CF), a condition for the valuation model in Section 3. This
restriction reduces the number of loans to 8,180. In addition to the performance sensitive
feature, we require the existence of a debt-to-cash-￿ow default covenant in the contract. This
3See www.loanpricing.com for more information on the database and how to access it.
23requirement reduces our sample to 6,727 loans. We further restrict our sample to publicly
listed borrowers with su￿cient market and company information from the databases CRSP
and Compustat prior to the inception of the loan. Information from these databases is used to
estimate the drift and volatility parameters of the borrowers’ cash ￿ow process in expression
(1). Hence, we require the borrowing company to be listed in the two latter databases,
and to have a minimum of 1 year of historical data for parameter estimation 4. This last
restriction reduces our sample to 5,143 loans. To ensure compatibility with our model, we
also remove all contracts where the estimated starting value of the Debt/CF process is below
the default covenant, the loan has no stated maturity, the number of barriers do not match
the number of di￿erent loan credit spreads, or the loan credit spreads are not varying across
di￿erent barriers. Some of the remaining loans in our sample are identical and come from
the same loan deal. To avoid duplications, we keep only one loan from each deal. Our ￿nal
sample consists of 3,052 loans. The sample includes 342 interest decreasing contracts, 1,520
interest increasing contracts, and 1,190 contracts containing both categories of performance
sensitive interest rates. All loans are senior and secured, and are granted by banks in the
time period 1993 - 2010. 93% of all loans are granted to U.S. ￿rms, whereas the remaining
7% are granted to European or Canadian ￿rms.
4To ensure correct matching of companies in Dealscan with Compustat/CRSP we use the Dealscan-
Compustat links from Chava & Roberts (2008). We thank Michael Roberts for providing us with the
matching ￿le.
24B.2 Sample Presentation
Table V lists summary statistics of our sample. The loans have from 1 - 8 non-absorbing
Debt/CF barriers with a mean of 3.46 and a median of 3. The size of the loans varies from
USD 0.6m to USD 10.7bn, whilst the average loan amount is USD 181m. No PSD loan has
maturity above 21 years, whilst the average maturity is 4.54 years. The average initial credit
spread, measured by the all-in-spread (AIS), is 187 basis points, with a sample standard
deviation of 86 basis points. When we analyze ￿rms using PSD loans we ￿nd no particular
size distribution. The average borrower pro￿tability, measured by the quarterly return on
capital employed (ROCE), is 4.1%, with a median of 3.5% and a standard deviation of 4.9%.
The average initial market leverage, de￿ned as the book value of debt divided by the by
the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity, just prior to establishing the
PSD loan, is 0.27. The corresponding median and standard deviation are 0.23 and 0.20,
respectively. To measure the relative signi￿cance of the PSD loan in the borrowers’ total
leverage, we estimate the ratio of the PSD loan divided by the total debt (the sum of ex-
isting debt and the new PSD loan). The average share of the new PSD loan relative to the
borrower’s total debt is 48%, with a median of 46% and a standard deviation of 26%. We
do not know whether the borrowers’ existing debt has PSD provisions. In our sample, 46%
of the borrowers are rated, and 37% of the rated borrowers are rated investment grade 5.
The average and median of the sample estimated annual cash ￿ow volatility are 11.9% and
4.4%, respectively. These volatility estimates range from 2% to 80%. The average distance-
5This is the general senior Standard & Poor’s rating of the borrower’s creditworthiness with respect to
its long-term ￿nancial obligations such as senior debt. The bank loans we analyze are not rated separately.
25to-default (DTD), de￿ned as the starting value of the CF/Debt measure less the contractual
default barrier, and normalized by the cash ￿ow volatility, is 49.2 with a standard deviation
of 114.8. In Table V we include the DTD characteristics for interest increasing and interest
decreasing loans, respectively. Table V shows, as we would expect, that interest increasing
contracts have a larger DTD compared to interest decreasing contracts. Summary statistics
for each of the three subsamples (interest increasing, interest decreasing, both provisions)
can be found in Tables XVI, XVII, and XVIII in Appendix B. See also Tables XII and XIII
for a statistical analysis by loan category. These tables show that borrowers using interest
increasing PSD contracts are more pro￿table and less levered compared to borrowers using
interest decreasing PSD contracts. Furthermore, they have a lower cash ￿ow volatility and
a larger contractual DTD. Firms using interest increasing PSD contracts also pay a lower
initial credit spread compared to borrowers using interest decreasing PSD contracts. These
observations unanimously suggest that borrowers using interest increasing PSD loans are of
an overall higher credit quality than those using interest decreasing PSD loans, when the
loan is granted.
To assess how representative our sample is, we compare it to the population of PSD
loans in the database. First of all, note that the sample borrower ratings correspond well
with the observations in Table III. For the entire database (our sample means in brackets)
the average maturity is 4.5 (4.54) years, the average loan amount is USD 369m (USD 181m),
the average borrower’s quarterly sales volume is USD 2,658m (USD 986m) and the average
26AIS is 194.6 (187) bp. These statistics, see Table VI, suggest that our sample consists of
somewhat smaller loans as well as smaller borrowers, but that the initial loan credit spreads
are close to the average of the population of PSD loans.
Full Sample Summary Statistics
Table V: This table shows summary statistics for various model input parameters and borrower
characteristics for the ￿nal sample used in the paper. The loan contracts in the sample
are granted in the period 1993-2010. Datasource: Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan Database,
Compustat and CRSP.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Borrower Characteristics
Company Sales (MUSD) 986 424 3,321 1.1 159,098 3,052
ROCE (%,quarterly) 4.09 3.53 4.94 -17.09 112.17 3,052
Leverage (Debt/(Debt + Equity)) 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.00 1.00 3,052
PSD Loan/Total Debt 0.48 0.46 0.26 0.003 1.00 3,052
Drift of cash ￿ow (r   ) 0.023 0.025 0.014 -0.09 0.06 3,052
Volatility of cash ￿ow () 0.12 0.044 0.171 0.02 0.80 3,052
Loan Characteristics
Loan Amount (MUSD) 181 100 316 0.6 10,700 3,052
Loan Maturity (Years) 4.54 5.00 1.68 0.08 21 3,052
All-In-Spread (Bp) 187 175 86 23 750 3,052
# of Barriers 3.46 3 1.25 1 8 3,052
Distance-to-default (DTD)
- Full Sample 49.2 6.6 114.8 0.00 1092.6 3,052
- Interest increasing 94.0 28.3 149.7 0.03 1092.6 1,520
- Interest decreasing 1.2 0.34 2.15 0.00 24.8 342
Comparison of PSD Sample and PSD Population
Table VI: Table shows sample averages as well as population averages for available variables (Bor-
rowers’ sales, loan maturity, loan amount and All-in-spread). Population is de￿ned as
all PSD loans in Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan database in the period 1993 - 2010.
PSD Sample PSD Population
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Company Sales (MUSD) 986 424 3,321 2,658 581 9,866
Loan Maturity (Years) 4.54 5.0 1.68 4.5 5.8 1.94
Loan Amount (MUSD) 181 100 316 369 149 879
All-In-Spread (Basis points) 187.5 175.0 86.5 194.6 175.0 116.5
N 3,052 27,994
27Terms of Example Contract
Table VII: This table provides an overview of the main terms in the chosen example PSD contract.
Borrower Actuant Corp.
Deal Active Date 31 Jul 2000
Amount USD 100 m




Lead Bank Credit Suisse First Boston
Reference Rate LIBOR 3 mth
Type of pricing grid Interest decreasing
Initial CF/Debt ratio 0.24
Borrower Senior Debt Rating (S&P) BB
4 Pricing a PSD Contract in the Case of No Shocks to
Credit Quality
In order to show how the model input parameters are estimated and how these parameters
in￿uence pricing, we select the ￿rst loan contract in our sample (sorted alphabetically by
borrower name), and illustrate the pricing of this contract using our closed form pricing
formula (11). The results for the entire sample are included and analyzed in the next section.
A Pricing of an Example Contract - No Shocks to Credit Quality
Actuant Corporation6 borrowed USD 100m in the year 2000 using a PSD contract. The
main terms of this contract are given in Table VII. The credit performance measure in this
contract links the interest paid on the loan to the performance of the company via the com-
6See www.actuant.com for more information on the company.
28Interest Rate Grid of the Example Contract
Table VIII: Table shows how the interest rate is linked to company cash ￿ow through the Debt/CF
ratio and the CF/Debt ratio respectively. A Debt/CF ratio equal to 4.55, or equiv-
alently a CF/debt ratio of 0.22, represents the maximum (minimum) ratio that is
accepted by the contract terms, and hence is the exogenously given contractual de-
fault barrier.
Performance Measure Interest Margins
Ranges Barriers Debt/CF CF/Debt LIBOR Spread Commitment Fee Total Spread
1 (B1;B0) [0;1:75) (0:57;1) 150 25 175
2 (B2;B1] [1:75;2) (0:5;0:57] 162.5 37.5 200
3 (B3;B2] [2;2:5) (0:4;0:5] 187.5 37.5 225
4 (B4;B3] [2:5;3) (0:33;0:4] 212.5 37.5 250
5 (B5;B4] [3;3:5) (0:29;0:33] 225 50 275
6 (B6;B5] [3:5;4:25) (0:24;0:29] 250 50 300
7 (C;B6] [4:25;4:55) (0.22;0:24] 275 50 325
pany’s Debt/CF ratio as shown in Table VIII 7. Debt equals the book value of total debt, and
is found by adding the company’s long-term debt and debt in current liabilities (DLTTQ +
DLCQ). We invert the Debt/CF ratio and assume that the borrower has a constant total
debt level until the maturity of the loan. Also note that this is an interest decreasing con-
tract since the starting level of the inverted performance measure (CF/debt) is 0.24, i.e., at
the lowest non-absorbing barrier. In order to price this contract we estimate the drift and
the volatility of the underlying cash ￿ow process. To estimate the drift we use the insight of
Goldstein et al. (2001) that the growth of the cash ￿ow process, under the equivalent martin-
gale measure Q, equals the risk-free rate r if the company retains all of its earnings. However,
a company with a payout rate  proportional to earnings, has a lower drift under Q equal to
r   . Payouts to investors and government typically consist of dividends to shareholders,
7The USDLIBOR (London Interbank O￿ered Rate) spread indicates the contractual spread over LIBOR
3 mth USD rate measured in basispoints. The total spread equals the sum of the LIBOR spread and a
commitment fee. CF equals cash ￿ow and is proxied in the loan contract, and in our analysis, by reported
EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciations and Amortizations).
29interest payments to debtholders, and tax payments to the government. Collecting quarterly
data (Compustat codes in brackets) on EBITDA (OIBDQ), interest expenses (XINTQ), in-
come taxes (TXTQ) and total dividends (DVTQ) from Compustat, we estimate  by the
ratio (XINTQ + TXTQ + DVTQ)/OIBDQ. The data is collected from the ￿scal quarter
before the loan is granted to ensure that the data would be common information available
to all parties8. For Actuant Corp. the estimate is  = 0:0218.
The volatility of the cash ￿ow process is not an observable input parameter in our model.
From equations (3) and (2) we know that the volatility of the cash ￿ow is equal to the volatil-
ity of the ￿rm’s assets. In order to estimate the asset volatility we adopt the procedure used
in Vassalou & Xing (2004) and Bharath & Shumway (2008). This procedure utilizes the
insights from Merton (1974) that equity is a call option on a ￿rm’s assets, where the strike
price of the call option is the face value of the ￿rm’s debt. The expiration date of the option
corresponds to the maturity of the debt. Recall that At and Dt denote the market value of
assets and the book value of debt, respectively. De￿ne the value of equity at time t by Et.
Using the Black-Scholes formula the time t market value of equity is given by
Et = AtN (d1)   Dte
 r(T t)N (d2); (12)
8One could alternatively use a longer time series to estimate . As a robustness check we estimate  for all
borrowers in our sample, using information from the last 4 quarters prior to loan inception. This procedure
















; d2 = d1   
p
T   t: (13)
We estimate  using the following iterative procedure. We download daily stock price data
from the past 12 months prior to the loan inception, calculate the volatility of equity E,
and use this as our initial guess for the estimation of . Using expression (12) we compute
At for each trading day for the past 12 months, using the observed market value of equity
of that particular day, and the last known observation of Dt. Thus, we create a new daily
time series of At, and estimate  from this new time series. This estimate is then used
as input for the next iteration. This procedure is repeated until the values of  from two
consecutive iterations converge. The tolerance level for convergence is 0.0001. Following
Bharath & Shumway (2008) we set T = 1 and de￿ne the face value of debt Dt as debt in
current liabilities (Compustat item DLCQ) plus one half of long-term debt (Compustat item
DLTTQ). In the case of Actuant Corp our estimate of the annual asset volatility, equal to
the annual cash ￿ow volatility, is  = 0:1188.
As an approximation for the risk-free rate we use the quote of the 3-month T-bill rate
in the month prior to the the loan issuance date 9, i.e., in this case June 2000. This risk-free
rate equals 5.83%, and implies that  = r ^  = 0:0583 0:0218 = 0:0365. The USD LIBOR
3 month rate is used as the reference interest rate in all loan contracts in our sample. To
9These are collected from the Federal Reserve’s o￿cial statistical releases
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm). The website also contains descriptions of
how these rates are measured.
31￿nd the correct interest rates to use throughout the loan period as our model input, we add
the contractual credit spreads to the forward LIBOR rates. Forward LIBOR rates are only
available up to one year maturity, and hence we proxy longer-term forward rates by swap
rates obtained from the quoted swap-curve when the loan is granted 10. In this example, the
maturity of the loan is 6 years, and we use the 6 year forward swap rate quoted in June 2000
as our reference rate. Adding the contractually determined credit spreads yields the interest
rates. As the contractual default barrier C, we use the ￿nancial covenant stating that the
maximum Debt/EBITDA ratio should not be above 4.55. This ratio corresponds to a value
of C (i.e., CF/Debt) equal to 1=4:55 = 0:22 in our model. The starting value of the asset
process, i.e., the current value of CF/Debt is 0.24. As an approximation of the recovery rate
(1 - ) we use the estimated recovery rate for senior secured bank debt from Altman, Resti
& Sironi (2004). This recovery rate 11 is 73%, implying that the liquidation cost parameter
 equals 27%. The liquidation cost parameter determines the loss in the case of default.
The size of the loss depends on whether the default leads to a full liquidation or not. Based
on the explanation in the introduction regarding the presence of cross-defaults, we choose
to apply the estimated liquidation cost parameter of 27%, even if we value a single debt
contract and not necessarily a borrower’s total debt. Practitioners con￿rm the magnitude
of this parameter. The face (par) value of debt is normalized to 100. Table IX summarizes
the values of our input parameters.
10See also www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm for information on swap curves.
11The estimated recovery rate is based on recovery of principal 30 days after default.
32Numerical Values of Input Parameters for the Example Contract
Table IX: This table states the value of all relevant input parameters needed to estimate the price
of the example PSD contract, as described in Tables VII and VIII.
Parameters Values Explanations
T 6 Maturity, in years
D 100 Face value of debt, normalized
B1 0.57 Barrier 1 (CF/Debt)
B2 0.50 Barrier 2 (CF/Debt)
B3 0.40 Barrier 3 (CF/Debt)
B4 0.33 Barrier 4 (CF/Debt)
B5 0.29 Barrier 5 (CF/Debt)
B6 0.24 Barrier 6 (CF/Debt)
C 0.22 Default Barrier (CF/Debt)
c1 0.0892 Interest rate paid when At  B1
c2 0.0917 Interest rate paid when B1 > At  B2
c3 0.0942 Interest rate paid when B2 > At  B3
c4 0.0967 Interest rate paid when B3 > At  B4
c5 0.0992 Interest rate paid when B4 > At  B5
c6 0.1017 Interest rate paid when B5 > At  B6
c7 0.1042 Interest rate paid when B6 > At > C
A 0.24 Starting value of the CF/Debt process
 0.0365 Risk-neutral drift of the CF/Debt process
 0.1188 Volatility of the CF/Debt process
r 0.0583 Risk-free interest rate
 0.27 Liquidation cost parameter
Given the parameter values in Table IX the market value of the PSD example contract at
issue is 95.44, calculated using expression (11). Thus, the theoretical market price is below
the par value of 100, and this contract is underpriced.
33B Decomposition of Interest Increasing and Interest Decreasing
PSD Contracts
In order to interpret our empirical results we ￿nd it useful to decompose a PSD contract
into a sum of a ￿xed rate loan and an option portfolio. From a lender’s point of view an
interest increasing PSD contract is equivalent to a ￿xed rate loan plus a portfolio of long
put options. The put options give the lender rights to receive increased interest payments
if the borrower’s credit quality deteriorates. The lender has this right each time interest
payments are due. Thus, we interpret this as a portfolio of options where the maturity of
each option corresponds to an interest payment date. Denote the time 0 market value of the
￿xed rate loan and the put option portfolio by F I
0 and P0, respectively. Using expression
(7), P0 =
Pm+n
i=1 B(;Bi)(ci+1  ci). Thus, the time 0 market value of the interest increasing
PSD loan LI
0 is given by LI
0 = F I
0 + P0.
An interest decreasing PSD contract is, from a lender’s point of view, equivalent to a
￿xed rate loan plus a portfolio of short call options. The call options give the borrower
rights to pay reduced interest rates, at any interest payment date, if its credit quality im-
proves. Since this right is held by the borrower, the lender is short in these options. Denote
the time 0 market value of the ￿xed rate loan and the call option portfolio by F D
0 and C0,
respectively. Using expression (6), C0 =
Pm+n
i=1 A(;Bi)(ci+1   ci). The market value of the
interest decreasing PSD loan LD
0 is LD
0 = F D
0  C0. The interest increasing/decreasing provi-
sions are contractually determined and one could, thus, argue that the put and call options
34do not include the customary optionality at maturity included in regular options. However,
any rational optionholder would exercise such options when they are in the money at ma-
turity, so we can safely apply the option interpretation. Also, since the size of the increase
or decrease in interest rate payments is independent of the underlying credit performance
measure within a certain range of the credit performance measure, the put and call options
are of digital type12. Normalizing the par value of the PSD loan to 100, the theoretically
correct time 0 price is F I
0 + P0 = 100 and F D
0   C0 = 100 for the interest increasing and
interest decreasing cases, respectively.
A PSD contract which has both interest increasing and interest decreasing provisions
can be decomposed into a portfolio of a ￿xed rate loan F B
0 , with ￿xed interest rate equal to
the initial interest rate of the PSD contract, a portfolio of short digital call options, and a
portfolio of long digital put options. This contract’s time 0 market value can be written as
F B
0   C0 + P0 = 100.
To calculate the valuation e￿ect that stems from the performance sensitive provisions
of the example contract from the previous section, we compare the theoretical value of the
PSD loan to the theoretical value of a ￿xed interest rate loan which pays an interest rate
equal to the initial interest rate c7 in Table IX. This value is calculated using a version of
12A digital option is an option whose payout is ￿xed after the underlying asset exceeds a predetermined
threshold or strike price. In the literature these options are also commonly referred to as ’cash-or-nothing’
options, see, e.g., McDonald (2006).




c() + D(1   )H
c(); (14)
where ci is the initial payment interest rate. Qc(), Hc() and Zc() are given by expressions
(17), (20) and (21), respectively. In this example ci = c7.
Using expression (14) and contractual terms from Table IX, the time 0 market value
of a ￿xed interest loan is 95.86, and, thus, there is a reduction in value from adding interest
decreasing provisions to the loan contract, the size of which equals 95:86   95:44 = 0:42.
This number equals the value of the call option portfolio C0 = 0:42.
The time 0 price ^ F0 of a comparable risk-free contract with the same initial interest









The di￿erence of 27:80 between the market value of the risk-free contract and the PSD
contract may be decomposed into 27.38 due to default risk and 0.42 due to the interest
decreasing credit performance sensitive provision.
365 Sample Analysis
We empirically test the pricing performance of our model in the following way: Firstly,
we collect contractual and borrower data. Secondly, we estimate volatility and drift from
borrower data. Thirdly, we impose ad hoc assumptions regarding shocks to credit quality,
implemented in our model as jumps in the amount of debt. Finally, we calibrate the model
prices to par using alternative jump frequencies. Subsequently, we analyze borrower pro￿les
and pricing errors using t-tests and probit regressions and indicate some interpretations of
our results.
A Speci￿cation of Shocks to Credit Quality
We assume that shocks to credit quality are given by jumps in the amount of debt.
Furthermore, we assume that Yi, the change in borrower’s total debt caused by jump i, is
lognormally distributed13 under the equivalent martingale measure Q. We assume that the
expectation and variance of Yi are EQ[Y ] = 2 and Var
Q[Y ] = 1
12, respectively, where super-
script Q indicates the measure under which these quantities are calculated. The assumed
value EQ[Y ] = 2 implies that the total amount of debt doubles, in risk-adjusted expecta-
tion, in case of a jump. We de￿ne 10 scenarios with di￿erent jump risk, assuming that the
risk-adjusted jump intensity  varies from 0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.05. These intensities
correspond to the following risk-adjusted frequencies, interpretable as, on average, one jump
every 20, 10, 62
3, 5, 4, 31
3, 26
7, 2:5, 22
9, 2 ’risk-adjusted years’, respectively. The jump inten-
13The speci￿c distributional assumption of the jump size is not important. We get similar quantitative
results using alternative distributions with the same numerical values of the ￿rst two moments.
37sities could, in principle, be estimated from data if we assumed that the process for debt
was stationary and we had su￿ciently long time series, as well as the market risk premia for
jump risk (size and frequency). We use jumps in the total amount of debt as a proxy for
shocks to credit quality. Note that we do not analyze a borrower’s optimal choice of capital
structure.
B Test Statistics
The market price of a PSD loan at time 0 is given from our model as an expectation, see
expression (8). Denote the price of PSD contract i, based on estimated input parameters
and assumptions regarding jumps as described in the previous subsection, by ^ Li. Our ￿rst





where N is the number of observations. If our model is correct, the time 0 market value of
each sample loan should be equal to the loan’s normalized face value (100). This fact implies
that also the average of the model’s time 0 market values should be equal the normalized
face value. Our second test statistic, M, is a measure of sample dispersion and is de￿ned as
the square root of the squared pricing errors (relative to the normalized face value). Here,
M is given by
M =








38If our pricing model correctly prices each individual loan contract, the numerical value of M
would be zero. This measure is related to the standard deviation measure which uses the
sample mean, instead of some theoretical value, as benchmark. Similar to standard deviation,
our measure gives higher weight to observations further away from the benchmark.
C Sample Results
Table X reports the average time 0 model price (  L), as well as M (dispersion), separately
for the full sample, interest increasing contracts, interest decreasing contracts, and contracts
containing both features. Row 1 reports the results assuming no jumps in debt value from
our closed form solution in expression (11). The remaining values have been estimated using
standard Monte Carlo simulation techniques.
For each of the 3,052 PSD contracts in our sample we collect contractual parameters
and the risk free rate (r), and estimate the drift (), and volatility () as explained in Sec-
tion 4.A. For the liquidation cost parameter we use  = 0:27 for all contracts (see discussion
in Section 4.A and Altman et al. (2004)). Subsequently, we calculate 10 000 simulations
of expression (8) in a C++ program. We discretize time into 100 subperiods per year. To
reduce variance we use the standard antithetic variate technique and (see, e.g., Glasserman
(2004)), in addition, we apply the formula in expression (11) as control variate in the cases
with jumps. The average pricing di￿erence between the closed form values and the simulated
39values in the case without jumps is 0.025% 14.
The results from the case of no jumps overprice PSD contracts, with a sample aver-
age price of 107.2. Considering each subsample, interest increasing contracts are overpriced
on average by 9:8% whereas contracts with both features are overpriced on average by 6:1%.
For interest decreasing contracts the model produces a small underpricing by on average
0:7%, and average estimated contract values,  L, which are not signi￿cantly di￿erent from
100. The dispersion, M, of prices ranges from 12.2 to 17.6 for the various subsamples.
Rows 2 - 10 in Table X report the average price and dispersion measure for alternative
values of the jump intensity  from 0:05 to 0:5. As expected, average prices are decreasing
in jump intensity. For the full sample  = 0:2 produces average loan price closest to par
value, with an underpricing by only 0:7%. Price dispersion is smallest for  = 0:15. For
interest increasing contracts  = 0:4 produces the sample average price closest to par value.
For this category the smallest M is produced for  = 0:35. Interest decreasing contracts are
priced closest to par value for  = 0, although the model dispersion is smallest for  = 0:1.
Contracts with both interest increasing and interest decreasing features have the lowest M
for  = 0:15, but the average price is closest to par value for  = 0:1. For all three subsam-
ples the value of  which produces the value closest to par value is close to the value of the
 which produces the lowest M. Figure 3 shows the distributions of loan prices for the full
14The total computer time for 3,052 contracts is about 6 hours and 20 minutes (2.8 GHz Intel Core i7
processor).
40Sample Results
Table X: Table shows the time 0 average loan price (  L), as well as the price dispersion (M) for
various jump intensities of debt. The results are reported for the full sample, interest
increasing PSD contracts, interest decreasing PSD contracts and contracts with both fea-
tures, respectively. The superscript $ indicate that the sample average is not signi￿cantly
di￿erent from 100, at a 5% signi￿cance level.
Full Sample Interest Increasing Interest Decreasing Both
  L M  L M  L M  L M
0:00 107.199 13.272 109.782 12.184 99:269$ 17.605 106.089 13.149
0:05 104.993 11.634 108.992 11.498 95.311 15.264 102.580 10.544
0:10 102.934 10.738 107.999 10.781 92.137 14.519 99:482$ 9.305
0:15 101.022 10.413 106.879 10.104 89.543 14.744 96.755 9.226
0:20 99.249 10.494 105.664 9.524 87.438 15.453 94.366 9.893
0:25 97.618 10.842 104.418 9.097 85.708 16.323 92.273 10.912
0:30 96.105 11.346 103.150 8.840 84.266 17.215 90.429 12.045
0:35 94.712 11.935 101.883 8.770 83.074 18.041 88.817 13.168
0:40 93.430 12.559 100.646 8.859 82.055 18.809 87.404 14.228
0:45 92.245 13.189 99.438 9.098 81.215 19.470 86.151 15.209
0:50 91.159 13.806 98.274 9.445 80.492 20.064 85.060 16.094
sample and the three subsamples, using the  values from the calibration.
From Table X we see that introducing jump risk in the debt process has large e￿ects,
both in terms of the level of prices, but also in terms of the dispersion of prices. This obser-
vation suggests that the risk of a shock to credit quality might be important when valuing
PSD contracts. Observe that including a small jump risk decreases dispersion compared to
no jump risk across all subsamples.
41D Comparing Borrower Characteristics of Interest Increasing and
Decreasing Contracts
We know from Subsection 3.B.2 that ￿rms with interest increasing PSD contracts seem
to be of an overall better credit quality than ￿rms with interest decreasing PSD contracts. In
particular, the average (median) leverage of the former group is 0.19 (0.14), versus the latter
group at 0.42 (0.40), cf. Tables XVI and XVII. Table XI displays the correlation between
Correlations Between Loan Type and Indicators of Credit Quality
Table XI: Table shows the correlation between a dummy variable called ’type’ and several indi-
cators of borrower credit quality. The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the PSD
loan is of interest increasing type, and the value 0 if the loan is of interest decreasing
type. All correlation coe￿cients are signi￿cant at a 1% signi￿cance level. The default
probabilities are simulated.
Type Asset Volatility Leverage ROCE DTD Payout Default Probability
Correlation -0.2864 -0.4462 0.1466 0.2569 -0.1538 -0.0898
several indicators of credit quality and a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the loan is of
interest increasing type, and the value 0 if the loan is of interest decreasing type. Table XI
further supports the idea that borrowers with a higher credit quality select interest increasing
PSD contracts. Examining credit ratings for the two subsamples, we also ￿nd that 15% of
borrowers using interest increasing PSD contracts are rated investment grade, compared to
only 6% of the borrowers using interest decreasing PSD contracts. It is, therefore, likely
that the former category of borrowers have larger debt capacity and, hence, have a higher
probability of increasing debt in the future. The latter category of ￿rms are likely to have
lower debt capacity implying that they have less chance of obtaining additional debt ￿nancing
in the future. Note that borrowers with higher credit quality normally could expect to obtain
42more competitive terms on their debt. The calibration of our model shows a signi￿cant
di￿erence between interest increasing and interest decreasing contracts regarding shocks to
credit quality. From Table X we see that, in a model disregarding shocks to credit quality,
interest increasing PSD contracts are valued 9.8% above par. Our results establish the puzzle
that the most ￿nancially sound borrowers choose interest increasing PSD contracts, which
are priced re￿ecting a substantially larger risk of reduced credit quality, compared to interest
decreasing PSD contracts. These ￿ndings indicate that banks price interest increasing PSD
contracts by rationally taking into account the probability that borrowers will increase the
amount of debt, and is not inconsistent with the hypothesis of Manso et al. (2010), that high
quality ￿rms use interest increasing PSD contracts to signal quality.
E Analyzing Pricing Errors
We analyze the pricing errors based on our earlier calibration. We include other potential
factors, not necessarily included in our pricing model, that may a￿ect prices of PSD loans.
Following Eom et al. (2004), we compare loans that are overpriced to loans that are under-
priced. We use the variables asset volatility, payout ratio, leverage, and distance-to-default
to capture the risk characteristics of the borrowers. We, furthermore include log of sales
as a proxy for borrower size and ROCE to measure borrower pro￿tability. We also include
loan speci￿c characteristics like amount, maturity, and initial credit spread. In addition, we
include PSD contract characteristics like number of non-absorbing barriers and credit perfor-
43Distribution of Calibrated Contract Prices
Figure 3: The histograms show the distribution of time 0 theoretical market values of the full
sample of PSD contracts ( = 0:2), interest increasing PSD contracts ( = 0:4), in-
terest decreasing PSD contracts ( = 0), and contracts with both features ( = 0:1),
respectively.
mance sensitivity15. To measure the relative importance of PSD in the ￿rm’s debt structure
we also use the ratio of the new PSD loan to other debt the company had at the time of issue.
For each of the chosen variables we initially use a t-test to test whether or not there
are any di￿erence in means of the variables when comparing overpriced loans to underpriced
loans. Table XII reports the di￿erences in means from this test for the full sample and the
subsamples of interest increasing, interest decreasing and loans with both features, respec-
15To measure the credit performance sensitivity of a loan contract we de￿ne a variable called ’Di￿’, which
is the maximum credit spread less the minimum credit spread as speci￿ed in the PSD contract.
44tively. As an example, the large negative di￿erence in asset volatility indicates that over-
priced loans are granted to ￿rms with lower average asset volatility compared to underpriced
loans. Note also that these ￿rms have signi￿cantly lower leverage, higher distance-to-default
and higher return. Overall, our model tends to overprice loans given to ￿rms which are
less risky and more pro￿table, as discussed above. The two categories of loans also di￿er in
amount, initial credit spread and maturity, with overpriced loans having smaller amounts,
shorter maturities and larger initial credit spreads. The performance sensitivity parameter
does not seem to in￿uence pricing, but overpriced loans have, on average, fewer barriers
speci￿ed in the contract. For overpriced loans the relative importance of the PSD in the
debt structure is much larger, probably re￿ecting the fact that these ￿rms tend to have
lower total debt, and higher probability of increased borrowing. The borrower size variable
is insigni￿cant for the full sample and the subsamples of interest increasing and interest
decreasing contracts. By looking at the three subsamples, we observe that the signs and the
signi￿cance of the test statistics comparing over- versus underpriced contracts are similar to
the full sample. However, interest decreasing contracts di￿er in that only asset volatility is
of statistical and economic di￿erence between over- and underpriced loans. This observation
is somewhat puzzling given the distribution of loan values shown in Figure 3.
The results in Table XII point to a number of systematic di￿erences which may a￿ect the
pricing of PSD loans. A combination of factors may lead to higher or lower pricing errors,
and therefore that an analysis in a multivariate regression setting is more appropriate. We
45Comparing Means for Over- and Under-priced Loans
Table XII: Table shows the di￿erence in means of borrower, loan, and PSD characteristics when
comparing overpriced PSD loans to underpriced PSD loans. A negative value suggests
that overpriced loans have a smaller mean compared to underpriced loans. A super-
script of ,  and  indicate a signi￿cance level of 5%, 1% and 0:1%, respectively.
T-Statistics
Variables Full Sample Interest Increasing Interest Decreasing Both
( = 0:2) ( = 0:4) ( = 0:0) ( = 0:1)
Borrower Characteristics
Asset Volatility -0.13 -0.08 -0.34 -0.21
Leverage (Debt/(Debt + Equity)) -0.20 -0.17 -0.02 -0.08
ROCE (%, quarterly) 0.02 0.01 0.004 0.004
DTD 90.31 140.53 2.00 7.00
Payout Ratio -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.005
Size (MUSD) 25.97 -74.89 207.13 -192.78
Loan Characteristics
Loan Amount (MUSD) -47.54 -45.47 40.30 -83.53
Loan Maturity -0.39 -0.89 0.22 -0.20
Initial Credit Spread -4.66 8.43 2.45 15.66
PSD Characteristics
# Barriers -0.27 -0.15 -0.56 -0.20
Di￿ -0.03 0.02 -0.10 0.02
PSD/Debt 0.23 0.23 0.02 0.04
de￿ne a new dummy variable ’overpricing’, which is equal to 1 if the loan is overpriced, i.e.,
if ^ Li > 100 and 0 if the loan is underpriced, i.e., ^ Li < 100, using subsample calibrated 
values. We then use a probit model to regress this dummy variable on our set of explanatory
variables, as well as year dummies for the year the loan is granted. Table XIII reports the
coe￿cients from the probit regression and the corresponding standard errors. A regression
of the whole sample shows that if a loan is of interest increasing type the probability that
it will be overpriced is higher. We also see that the probability of overpricing increases
with the initial credit spread paid on the loan and the performance sensitivity of the PSD
contract, whereas it decreases with maturity. Our model also overprice loans given to safer
borrowers, as seen by the negative coe￿cients on payout-ratio and asset volatility, and on
46the positive coe￿cients on distance-to-default. No other explanatory variables are signi￿cant.
Motivated by the fundamental di￿erences in borrower characteristics and contract fea-
tures, we also run regressions for each of the three subsamples. The other regressions in Table
XIII therefore report the results using the model speci￿cation that produce the sample av-
erage closest to par value for the subsample. From Column 2 we see that the probability
that interest increasing PSD contracts will be overpriced is inversely related to leverage,
loan amount and maturity, and positively related to initial credit spread paid on the loan,
the relative size of the loan and the distance-to-default. The negative coe￿cient on current
leverage supports our earlier interpretation that overpricing may be explained by jump risk
in the amount of debt. A borrower with high leverage today is less likely to increase leverage
in the future. However, we see that by introducing jump risk in the modeling of interest
increasing contracts the partial signi￿cance of leverage in explaining overpricing in Table X
nearly disappears. All other explanatory variables are insigni￿cant. The probability that
an interest decreasing PSD contract is overpriced is inversely related to the asset volatility,
whereas, it is positively related to initial credit spread and distance-to-default. The results
are similar when analyzing the subsample of PSD contracts containing both interest increas-
ing and interest decreasing features, except that the performance sensitivity of the contract
and the number of barriers also become signi￿cant. Overall the only two variables that get
signi￿cant coe￿cients across all 4 regressions are the initial credit spread paid on the loan
and the distance-to-default. This observation indicates that the pricing of the PSD loans
47is crucially related to the initial credit spread, and that the performance sensitive features
added to the loan contract are of lesser importance for any over- or underpricing. We also see
that loans with a high contractual distance-to-default tend to be more overpriced, i.e., that
the model tend to underestimate the probability of default for the safest ￿rms. This is both
consistent with high jump risk and earlier results regarding the performance of structural
credit models as discussed above.
F Interpretation of the Empirical Results
The results and the subsequent analysis in the previous subsections point to several in-
teresting insights.
Firstly, we price PSD contracts with, in expectation, downward jumps in the credit
performance measure, interpreted more generally as shocks to credit quality. We have cho-
sen to implement the jumps as changes in the borrower’s total debt, allowing for the use
of a continuous cash ￿ow process. Our performance measure is a ratio between these two
quantities, and we naturally model each quantity separately. Practitioners tell us that the
Debt/CF performance measure is also used to discipline borrowers from additional borrow-
ing. The risk of shocks to credit quality could be modeled in several ways, but our choice of
adding jump risk to the amount of debt is analytically tractable.
Secondly, the identical jump intensity does not calibrate both interest increasing and
48Joint Test of Variables A￿ecting Pricing Errors
Table XIII: Estimation results from a Probit regression of a dummy variabel taking the value 1
if the PSD loan is overpriced and 0 otherwise on borrower characteristics like asset
volatility, leverage, ROCE, distance-to-default (DTD), payout ratio and size (proxied
by log of sales). Furthermore we also use explanatory variables speci￿c to the loan
contracts like log of loan amount, maturity, initial credit spread paid on the loan,
number of non-absorbing barriers, a variable (di￿) measuring the performance sen-
sitivity in the contract, as well as the relative size of the PSD loan to existing debt.
We also include calendar year dummy variables and two dummy variables capturing
whether the loan is of interest increasing or interest decreasing type. The regression
is run using the best ￿tted pricing model for the full sample as well as the three
subsamples, as indicated by the  values. We report coe￿cients and robust standard
errors in parenthesis.
Full Sample Interest Increasing Interest Decreasing Both
( = 0:2) ( = 0:4) ( = 0:0) ( = 0:1)
Borrower Characteristics
Asset Volatility -1.473  -0.286 -14.511 -6.328
(0.275) (0.423) (3.688) (0.676)
Leverage -0.072 -0.872  -0.653 0.187
(0.258) (0.443) (0.607) (0.361)
ROCE 1.738 2.230 2.886 2.017
(1.346) (1.938) (5.144) (2.193)
Distance-to-default 0.226  0.063 0.539 0.237
(0.014) (0.008) (0.164) (0.030)
Payout Ratio -0.255  -0.102 -0.022 -0.111
(0.060) (0.056) (0.141) (0.061)
Size -0.063 0.099 -0.106 -0.082
(0.047) (0.058) (0.137) (0.061)
Loan Characteristics
Amount -0.006 -0.139  -0.217 -0.087
(0.053) (0.067) (0.155) (0.069)
Maturity -0.054 -0.309 0.083 -0.011
(0.027) (0.037) (0.090) (0.038)
Initial Credit Spread 0.007  0.009 0.011 0.007
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.002) (0.0009)
PSD Characteristics
Number of Barriers -0.046 -0.097 -0.079 -0.119 
(0.049) (0.066) (0.149) (0.060)
Di￿ 0.547 0.263 0.485 0.816
(0.147) (0.184) (0.595) (0.199)
PSD/Debt 0.301 1.116  0.108 0.020
(0.230) (0.279) (0.706) (0.323)




N 3,052 1,520 342 1,190
Pseudo R2 0.720 0.638 0.6489 0.538
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
49interest decreasing PSD contracts to par values. This fact suggests that there is a funda-
mental di￿erence between the typical borrower using interest increasing PSD and interest
decreasing PSD, respectively. According to our model, the market prices interest decreasing
contracts as if no jump risk is present. Interest increasing contracts are priced consistent
with a risk-adjusted jump intensity of 0.4, suggesting that jump risk is important in the
pricing of these contracts. Based on these results we believe that the pricing of interest
increasing PSD contracts re￿ects that the companies using these contracts probably have
a larger debt capacity, and therefore have a higher probability of adding new debt to their
capital structure in the future. The pricing of interest decreasing contracts re￿ects that
companies using such contracts probably have a smaller debt capacity and a lower probabil-
ity of additional debt funding in the future. This interpretation is supported by comparing
borrower characteristics for the subsamples. Our ￿ndings support the signaling hypothesis of
Manso et al. (2010), and add to the understanding of their ￿ndings. High quality borrowers
might be able to signal quality to the market by using interest increasing PSD loans. High
quality borrowers acknowledge the presence of risk of reduced credit quality and ￿nd the
conditions of interest increasing contracts acceptable. Low quality borrowers which have less
debt capacity ￿nd interest increasing contracts too expensive. Our results are in contrast to
the ￿ndings of Asquith et al. (2005), who ￿nd that interest decreasing PSD loans tend to be
used when costs related to adverse selection problems are larger.
Thirdly, our analysis of pricing errors shows that borrower’s contractual distance-to-
50default is particularly important. A large DTD value increases the probability that our
model calibrated with jump risk overprice any type of PSD contract. One way to com-
pensate this problem is to increase the probability of jumps in the underlying performance
measure. In our class of PSD contracts, a jump in the credit performance measure is mod-
eled by a jump in borrower’s total debt. Interest increasing loans, used by borrowers with a
large DTD, require a higher jump intensity in debt to be priced correctly, on average. Our
￿ndings are consistent with other empirical tests of structural debt pricing models, see, e.g.,
Eom et al. (2004) and Huang & Huang (2003).
6 Conclusions and Further Research
A Conclusions
Performance sensitive debt is a large class of debt contracts where the interest payment
is contractually de￿ned to change according to some predetermined credit performance mea-
sure. Our model prices PSD contracts with cash ￿ow and debt based credit performance
measures. Based on ￿nancial valuation theory, we derive a valuation model and test its per-
formance empirically on a sample of 3,052 PSD contracts using contractual, borrower and
market data, as well as calibrated jump frequencies. Our model incorporate ￿nite maturity,
jump risk in the borrower’s total amount of debt, as well as exogenous contract-speci￿c de-
fault covenants. In the special case of no jump risk, we also derive a closed form solution for
the market price of the contract.
51In our empirical analysis, we show that interest decreasing contracts are priced on aver-
age closest to par value using our closed form model disregarding shocks to credit quality,
whilst for interest increasing contracts a substantial amount of credit quality risk calibrates
the model price to par value. This result ￿ts well with characteristics of borrowers using
such contracts which have a larger debt capacity due to an overall higher credit quality, e.g.,
represented by a larger distance-to-default, and a lower current leverage. A comparison of
borrower characteristics for the two subsamples con￿rms this interpretation. Our empirical
results show that PSD contracts are priced recognizing the risk of future increases in debt
with a potentially negative e￿ect on current loan value. These results also contribute to
a better understanding of the signaling hypothesis presented in Manso et al. (2010). High
quality borrowers, which are less credit constrained, may signal quality through the use of
interest increasing PSD loans. Low quality borrowers, which are more credit constrained,
choose not to mimic this behavior since they have to incur a cost related to the lenders
assessment of future jump risk, i.e., risk of increased leverage. Instead they would prefer
interest decreasing PSD loans.
In addition to an increased understanding of PSD loans, we also contribute to the more
general literature which empirically test structural debt models. Our results support earlier
￿ndings that structural debt models require jump risk in order to calibrate market prices on
loans given to the safest borrowers.
52B Future Research
An important implementation issue for PSD contracts is the observability and veri￿abil-
ity of the underlying performance measure. For accounting based performance measures the
observability is determined by the borrower’s external ￿nancial reporting frequency. These
reports present a delayed and discretized measure of the borrower’s credit quality. Any val-
uation e￿ects of these implementation issues are not included in our analysis, but might be
an avenue for future research.
Our analysis suggests that borrowers using interest decreasing PSD contracts have higher
leverage and, correspondingly, lower debt capacity. This result indicate that interest decreas-
ing PSD loans might be used when problems related to debt overhang are severe. Intuitively,
a debt contract that promises reduced interest rate payments when ￿rm performance in-
crease, might incentivize borrowers to invest earlier.
Although debt contracts have default clauses, a violation of those clauses does not nec-
essarily trigger bankruptcy in reality. However, the lender may instead instead renegotiate
the contract. Our pricing approach is based on the assumption that hitting the bankruptcy
barrier automatically trigger default. There is a recent literature built around the idea that
debt can be renegotiated, see ,e.g., Hackbarth, Hennessy, & Leland (2007) or Garleanu &
Zwiebel (2009). Future research may take this idea into account.
53Our ￿nding that interest increasing PSD loans are priced re￿ecting a high risk of shocks
to credit quality is also a potential avenue for further studies. This research idea includes a
closer review of loan covenants as well as general ex post realizations.
Our model is based on a constant risk free interest rate. Clearly, our analysis can be
extended to a model with stochastic interest rates.
54References
Altman, E., Resti, A., & Sironi, A. (2004). Default recovery rates in credit risk modelling:
a review of the literature and empirical evidence. Economic Notes, 33(2), 183￿208.
Asquith, P., Beatty, A., & Weber, J. (2005). Performance pricing in debt contracts. Journal
of Accounting and Economics , 40(1).
Bhanot, K., & Mello, A. (2006). Should corporate debt include a rating trigger? Journal of
Financial Economics , 79(1), 69￿98.
Bharath, S., & Shumway, T. (2008). Forecasting default with the Merton distance to default
model. Review of Financial Studies , 21(3), 1339.
Black, F., & Cox, J. (1976). Valuing corporate securities: Some e￿ects of bond indenture
provisions. Journal of Finance, 31(2), 351￿367.
Carey, M., Post, M., & Sharpe, S. (1998). Does corporate lending by banks and ￿nance
companies di￿er? Evidence on specialization in private debt contracting. The Journal of
Finance, 53(3), 845￿878.
Chava, S., & Roberts, M. (2008). How does ￿nancing impact investment? The role of debt
covenants. The Journal of Finance , 63(5), 2085￿2121.
Coculesco, D., Geman, H., & Jeanblanc, M. (2008). Valuation of default-sensitive claims
under imperfect information. Finance and Stochastics , 12(2), 195￿218.
55Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R., & Helwege, J. (2003). Is credit event risk priced? Mod-
eling contagion via the updating of beliefs. Working paper, Carnegie-Mellon University .
Du￿e, D. (2001). Dynamic asset pricing theory . Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ.
Du￿e, D., & Lando, D. (2001). Term structures of credit spreads with incomplete accounting
information. Econometrica, 69(3), 633￿664.
Eom, Y., Helwege, J., & Huang, J. (2004). Structural models of corporate bond pricing: An
empirical analysis. Review of Financial Studies , 17(2), 499.
Garleanu, N., & Zwiebel, J. (2009). Design and renegotiation of debt covenants. Review of
Financial Studies , 22(2), 749￿781.
Geske, R. (1977). The valuation of corporate liabilities as compound options. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 12(4), 541￿552.
Glasserman, P. (2004). Monte Carlo methods in ￿nancial engineering , vol. 53. Springer
verlag.
Goldstein, R., Ju, N., & Leland, H. (2001). An EBIT-based model of dynamic capital
structure. The Journal of Business , 74(4), 483￿512.
Guo, X., Jarrow, R., & Zeng, Y. (2009). Credit risk models with incomplete information.
Mathematics of Operations Research , 34(2), 320￿332.
Hackbarth, D., Hennessy, C., & Leland, H. (2007). Can the trade-o￿ theory explain debt
structure? Review of Financial Studies , 20(5), 1389￿1428.
56Houweling, P., Mentink, A., & Vorst, T. (2004). Valuing euro rating-triggered step-up
telecom bonds. Journal of Derivatives , 11(3), 63￿80.
Huang, J.-Z., & Huang, M. (2003). How Much of Corporate- Treasury Yield Spread Is Due
to Credit Risk?: A New Calibration Approach. Working Paper, Stanford University .
Jarrow, R., Lando, D., & Turnbull, S. (1997). A Markov model for the term structure of
credit risk spreads. Review of ￿nancial studies , 10(2), 481￿523.
Jarrow, R., & Protter, P. (2004). Structural versus reduced form models: A new information
based perspective. Journal of Investment Management , 2(2), 1￿10.
Jarrow, R., & Turnbull, S. (1992). Credit risk: Drawing the analogy. Risk Magazine, 5(9),
63￿70.
Jarrow, R., & Turnbull, S. (1995). Pricing derivatives on ￿nancial securities subject to credit
risk. The Journal of Finance , 50(1), 53￿85.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the ￿rm: Managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics , 3(4), 305￿360.
Jones, E., Mason, S., & Rosenfeld, E. (1984). Contingent claims analysis of corporate capital
structures: An empirical investigation. Journal of Finance, 39(3), 611￿625.
Koziol, C., & Lawrenz, J. (2010). Optimal design of rating-trigger step-up bonds: Agency
con￿icts versus asymmetric information. Journal of Corporate Finance , 16(2), 182￿204.
Lando, D. (2004). Credit risk modeling . Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ.
57Lando, D., & Mortensen, A. (2004). On the pricing of step-up bonds in the European telecom
sector. Journal of Credit Risk , 1(1).
Leland, H. (1994). Corporate debt value, bond covenants, and optimal capital structure.
Journal of Finance, (pp. 1213￿1252).
Lindset, S., Lund, A., & Persson, S.-A. (2011). Credit risk and asymmetric information: A
simpli￿ed approach. Discussion paper 9/2008, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) .
Longsta￿, F., & Schwartz, E. (1995). A simple approach to valuing risky ￿xed and ￿oating
rate debt. The Journal of Finance , 50(3), 789￿819.
Manso, G., Strulovici, B., & Tchistyi, A. (2010). Performance-sensitive debt. Review of
Financial Studies , 23(5), 1819￿1854.
McDonald, R. (2006). Derivatives markets . Addison-Wesley Reading, MA.
Merton, R. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates.
Journal of Finance, 29(2), 449￿470.
Merton, R. (1976). Option pricing when underlying stock returns are discontinuous. Journal
of Financial Economics , 3(1-2), 125￿144.
Mjłs, A., & Persson, S.-A. (2010). Level dependent annuities: Defaults of multiple degrees.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 45(5), 1311￿1339.
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate ￿nancing decisions when ￿rms have investment
information that investors do not. Journal of Financial Economics , 13(2), 187￿221.
58Roberts, M., & Su￿, A. (2009). Renegotiation of ￿nancial contracts: Evidence from private
credit agreements. Journal of Financial Economics , 93(2), 159￿184.
Tchistyi, A. (2006). Security design with correlated hidden cash ￿ows: The optimality of
performance pricing. New York University Working Paper .
Tchistyi, A., Yermack, D., & Yun, H. (2010). Negative hedging: Performance sensitive debt
and CEOs’ equity incentives. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 1(1), 1￿64.
Vassalou, M., & Xing, Y. (2004). Default risk in equity returns. The Journal of Finance ,
59(2), 831￿868.
Appendix A Closed Form Solutions in the Case of No
Jumps
Let N() denote the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
A Survival probability
The survival probability Qc() is given by
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B Time 0 market price of 1 upon default




















where u = (   (1=2)2)=, w =
p
u2 + 2r, and b = ln(C=)=, see Appendix B.2 in Lando
(2004).















































































and  is given in expression (18). Furthermore,
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g is given in expression (22).
D Time 0 market values of above unity annuities







































































































































































































































From the expressions (12) and (15) in Mjłs & Persson (2010) it follows that
A
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g;Qgg(B) are given in expressions (25), (26), (22), (27), respectively.
E Time 0 market values of below unity annuities
The following result is from expression (18) in Mjłs & Persson (2010).
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l are given in expressions (25), (26), (23), respectively. Here,
Qlg(B) = Q
c()   Qgg(B); (30)
where Qc() and Qgg(B) are given in the expressions (17) and (27), respectively. From the
expressions (13) and (16) in Mjłs & Persson (2010) it follows that
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l are given in expressions (25), (26), (30), (23), respectively.
Observe that r(a(;B) + a(;B)) = r(b(;B) + b(;B)) = Zc(), the value of an above-
and a below annuity should add to the value of a regular annuity, no matter if the initial
value  is above or below a given B.
65Appendix B Tables and Graphs
Industry Distribution of PSD
Table XIV: This table shows the industry distribution of borrowers of performance sensitive debt
across broad industry classes. Datasource: Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan database for
the years 1993-2010 (N=25,602).





Non-bank Financial Inst. 5.1 %
Utilities 5.1 %
Others 1.3 %
Descriptive Loan Statistics of Database
Table XV: This table shows discriptive statistics for maturity and loan amounts for loans contain-
ing PSD features and for loans not containing PSD features. Datasource: Thomson
Reuter’s Dealscan database for the years 1993-2010.
Maturity (Years) Facility Amount (MUSD)
PSD Facilities Non-PSD Facilities PSD Facilities Non-PSD Facilities
Mean 8.7 9.4 373 195
Median 10 8 150 60
St.Dev 4.6 8.3 887 602
Min 0.17 0.17 0 0
Max 64.2 146.8 30,000 61,607
N 25,602 192,602 25,602 192,602
66Summary Statistics for Interest Increasing PSD Contracts
Table XVI: This table shows summary statistics for various model input parameters and ￿rm
characteristics for the interest increasing PSD contracts in the sample used in
the paper. The loan contracts are granted in the period 1993 - 2010. Datasource:
Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan Database, Compustat and CRSP.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Borrower Characteristics
Company Sales (MUSD) 1,034 381 4,465 3.28 159,098 1,520
ROCE (%,quarterly) 5.01 4.27 6.24 -12.86 112.17 1,520
Leverage (Debt/(Debt + Equity)) 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.99 1,520
PSD Loan/Total Debt 0.59 0.58 0.27 0.00 1.00 1,520
Drift of cash ￿ow 0.024 0.027 0.014 -0.09 0.058 1,520
Volatility of cash ￿ow 0.084 0.038 0.13 0.02 0.80 1,520
Loan Characteristics
Loan Amount (MUSD) 164 100 350 0.06 10,700 1,520
Maturity (Years) 4.47 5.00 1.72 0.08 21 1,520
All-In-Spread (Bp) 186 175 89 23 750 1,520
# of Barriers 3.2 3 1.20 1 7 1,520
Distance-to-default 94.1 28.3 149.7 0.03 1092.6 1,520
67Summary Statistics of Interest Decreasing PSD Contracts
Table XVII: This table shows summary statistics for various model input parameters and ￿rm
characteristics for the interest decreasing PSD contracts in the sample used in
the paper. The loan contracts are granted in the period 1993 - 2010. Datasource:
Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan Database, Compustat and CRSP.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Borrower Characteristics
Company Sales (MUSD) 880 475 1,217 9 10,877 342
ROCE (%,quarterly) 2.77 2.60 3.79 -4.79 63.68 342
Leverage (Debt/(Debt + Equity)) 0.42 0.40 0.19 0.01 0.90 342
PSD Loan/Total Debt 0.30 0.27 0.18 0.02 1 342
Drift of cash ￿ow 0.02 0.022 0.013 -0.060 0.047 342
Volatility of cash ￿ow 0.20 0.08 0.23 0.02 0.80 342
Loan Characteristics
Loan Amount (MUSD) 184 100 278 2 3,000 342
Maturity (Years) 4.91 5.00 1.72 0.92 10.08 342
All-In-Spread (Bp) 219 225 87 50 600 342
# of Barriers 2.95 3 1.35 1 7 342
Distance-to-default 1.21 0.34 2.15 0.00 24.88 342
Summary Statistics for PSD Contracts Containing Both Increasing and
Decreasing Provisions
Table XVIII: This table shows summary statistics for various model input parameters and ￿rm
characteristics for sample PSD contracts containing both interest increasing
and interest decreasing provisions . The loan contracts are granted in the period
1993 - 2010. Datasource: Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan Database, Compustat and
CRSP.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Borrower Characteristics
Company Sales (MUSD) 954 466 1,550 1.08 19,424 1,190
ROCE (%,quarterly) 3.29 3.06 2.55 -17.09 24.57 1,190
Leverage (Debt/(Debt + Equity)) 0.33 0.29 0.19 0.01 0.99 1,190
PSD Loan/Total Debt 0.40 0.39 0.21 0.00 1 1,190
Drift of cash ￿ow 0.022 0.024 0.013 -0.07 0.053 1,190
Volatility of cash ￿ow 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.02 0.80 1,190
Loan Characteristics
Loan Amount (MUSD) 201 125 277 1.00 4,500 1,190
Maturity (Years) 4.53 5.00 1.60 0.25 10.17 1,190
All-In-Spread (Bp) 180 175 81 25 450 1,190
# of Barriers 3.93 4 1.13 2 8 1,190
Distance-to-default 5.81 2.59 9.29 0.01 78.73 1,190
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